


NTUMUN 2021

STUDY GUIDE



UNSC



NTU
MUN

2021

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAIR INTRODUCTIONS	2
WELCOME LETTER	4
INTRODUCTION TO COUNCIL	5
TOPIC 1: THE IRAN NUCLEAR ISSUE AND THE RENEGOTIATION OF THE JCPOA	7
SUMMARY	7
INTRODUCTION	7
BACKGROUND	8
DEFINITIONS	10
SCOPE OF DEBATE	11
KEY STAKEHOLDERS	15
QUESTIONS A RESOLUTION MUST ANSWER	16
ENDNOTES	16
BIBLIOGRAPHY	17
FURTHER READING	19
 TOPIC 2: REFORMATION OF THE UNSC	 20
SUMMARY	20
INTRODUCTION	20
BACKGROUND	21
DEFINITIONS	22
SCOPE OF DEBATE	23
KEY STAKEHOLDERS	24
QUESTIONS A RESOLUTION MUST ANSWER	25
ENDNOTES	26
BIBLIOGRAPHY	26
FURTHER READING	27

UN SECURITY COUNCIL

CHAIR INTRODUCTIONS

JUAN SEBASTIAN BELTRAN

(HEAD CHAIR OF UNSC)

Email: 23juanb@alice-smith.edu.my

Hello delegates, I'm Juan Sebastian Beltran and I'll be your head chair for the United Nations Security Council in this year's NTUMUN2021. I am currently an IGCSE student, begrudgingly admittedly, in the Alice Smith School in Malaysia and a Secretary-General of the MUN Society there (as well as on the secretariat for a few other Conferences across Malaysia). I've been doing MUN for 5 years now and I am a member of the governing association of MUN in Malaysia. I really do hope to give everyone in this council the unique opportunity to experience some of the most complicated and pertinent topics facing the foreign policy landscape of today. In a post-COVID and post-Trump world, looking back and analysing the Iran Deal is critical in balancing the world's nuclear powers, and this theme extends to the even greater task of reforming the primary authority in the international landscape: the United Nations Security Council. I wish the delegates the best of luck in manoeuvring through the ulterior motives and multifaceted contexts, and my door is always open for help or questions.

ANJANA PALAMAND

(Asst CHAIR)

Email: anjana.rao1608@gmail.com

Greetings delegates, it is with my utmost honour that I, Anjana Palamand, welcome you to the UNSC of NTUMUN 2021. Most likely to be seen reading about politics or humanitarian laws, I enjoy debating on some of the most controversial topics shaping the world's social structure (and why chocolate ice cream is the best!). Currently wrapping up my schooling years in NPS, Bengaluru, India, I am tuned into seeing different perspectives as I am studying science but wanting to pursue law. A flashback to three years ago, I would have never been interested in a MUN if my classmate did not force me into speaking in my first MUN, so, my advice for you is that, share your opinion out aloud as it is what moulds your thinking, changes your view and makes you a diplomatic, yet a loud-voiced individual. The world has enough issues today, and yet, the chances for making them right are more! After attending more than thirty conferences, being the Head Delegate of my school's delegation, the Secretary General of my school's MUN in 2020 and the President of the MUN club of my school, it goes without saying, Finnish up with your research, remember there is no Wong way, do not Russia observations or into conclusions and do not get Trumped! :)

SIVAKAMI D/O ARUNACHALAM

(Asst CHAIR)

Email: sivakamiarun@yahoo.com.sg

Hello delegates! It is my pleasure to usher you to the first virtual edition of NTUMUN 2021. I am Sivakami, a high school graduate from National Junior College Singapore awaiting to enter university this fall. I am looking forward to reading Economics and aspire to concretise theory to policies that benefit the human race from pressing issues like poverty and pervasive inequalities. I love intellectual discourses centred on global affairs and have attended several MUN conferences in Singapore, India and the US: holding the mantle of both a chair and delegate. Having served as the Internal Affairs and Liaisons Secretary of my school's MUN club, it has broadened my horizons of what MUN has to offer: it expands our worldview at such a tender age by instilling qualities such as diplomacy which is a lifelong asset. On a lighter note,

I am a travel fanatic, who also enjoys writing and volunteering pursuits!

If there is one thing I would like you to takeaway (both amateurs and seasoned veterans), please do not be secure in your comfort zones! The only tactic to overcome the stage fright is to face it. No one will judge you, feel free to approach me or fellow chairs for feedback to optimise your learning.

The world is in the most unprecedented circumstances now - because of both the pandemic season and rising geopolitical tensions which has kept us on the edge of the seat with nail-biting moments. Keeping this in mind, we look forward to hearing your solutions and substantive debates that are practical to implement!

WELCOME LETTER

Greetings delegates!

We cannot be more elated and proud to have you with us for the fifteenth edition of NTUMUN 2021! The UNSC has been intricately designed to test the humanitarian and non-democratic sentiments of every delegate, and knowing that some delegates are in the power to veto will make you a more stern, yet diplomatic individual in committee. To reiterate, an online environment can be demanding, but being an opportunist should be something you should be effortlessly displaying, now that you are a part of the UNSC!

After weeks of research and documentation, we finally realised the importance and significance of our agenda. What we thought was merely a deal between some countries turned out to be a humanitarian concern. The reforms to a Council in the United Nations never affected us till we realised that the system is so non-democratic and supports such an unjustified hierarchy. Hence, we must stress on how the agenda we are going to discuss holds an importance like never before. Your contribution is what may make the global community think, it is what may make States realise they are wrong, and cannot afford to trade the world's safety for their selfishness.

Lastly, we hope you understand the sensitivity of the topics. We have our biases, however, be rest assured that we shall set them aside, and listen to everyone's point of view. This said, we expect you to also be well researched, and not make sweeping generalizations or blatantly accuse your fellow members. Keeping this in mind, we hope you have a fruitful experience. Do note that we are open to giving/ receiving feedback, or even answering queries during any time of the conference, so feel free to reach out to us!

We cannot wait to see you!

Juan Sebastian Beltran

Anjana Palamand

Sivakami

UN SECURITY COUNCIL

INTRODUCTION TO COUNCIL

The United Nations Security Council or the UNSC is one of the six main organs of the United Nations. Unlike other councils, the UNSC is a continuous session, which implies that the members can meet at any time whenever peace is threatened. In the council, there are fifteen members, out of which five are permanent. These countries are The People's Republic of China, France, The Russian Federation, The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and The United States.

The five permanent members of the UNSC have the power to "veto" any substantive resolution, according to Article 27. Instead of abstaining, they can "nay" a resolution which preserves the resolution. However, this veto does not apply to procedural votes.

The other ten members can acquire a seat in the deliberations through a voting process that happens every two years. These are the non-permanent members of the UNSC. In 1963, in the eighteenth session, the Assembly decided that the ten members should be elected, so that five are from African and Asian States, one is from an Eastern Europe State, two are from Latin American States, and two are from Western Europe and other States.

These countries are Estonia, The Republic of India, Ireland, Kenya, The United Mexican States, The Republic of

Niger, Norway, Saint Vincent and Grenadines, The Republic of Tunisia, and Vietnam.^[1]

Convened first on 17 January 1946, the UNSC mandates to take action on those parties responsible for planning/ executing policies or practises condemned by the international community whilst minimising impact of measures taken by them on the affected parties' population and community. The body has the power to make decisions that member states are obligated to implement. It serves four main purposes, and that is to maintain international peace and security, to develop friendly relations among nations, to cooperate in solving international problems and in promoting respect for human rights, and to act as a centre for harmonising actions for nations.

In case of a complaint or a threat to peace being brought to the Council, it recommends parties to reach peaceful agreements by setting principles for the agreement, carrying out necessary investigations and mediations, dispatching missions, appointing special envoys, and requesting the Secretary General to use good offices to achieve a peaceful settlement.

In case there is a hostile dispute, it can issue ceasefire directives, and dispatch

military observers and peacekeeping forces.

The UNSC's enforcement measures include collective military action, sealing

place(s)/ area(s) of interest, implementing economic sanctions, severing diplomatic relations, sanctioning against the export of weaponry and dual-use items, travel bans, and financial penalties and restrictions. ^[2]

ENDNOTES

1. United Nations Security Council, "Composition of the UNSC" UNSC, <https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/current-members> (accessed January 25, 2021).
2. United Nations Security Council, "What is the Security Council?" UNSC, <https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/what-security-council> (accessed January 25, 2021).

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. United Nations Security Council, "Composition of the UNSC" *UNSC*, <https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/current-members> (accessed January 25, 2021).
2. United Nations Security Council, "What is the Security Council?" *UNSC*, <https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/what-security-council> (accessed January 25, 2021).

TOPIC 1: THE IRAN NUCLEAR ISSUE AND THE RENEGOTIATION OF THE JCPOA

SUMMARY

The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action is an agreement between the world powers and one of the strongest nuclear powers. Nuclear weaponry is doubtlessly the most harmful way of offence/defence carried out by a State. Keeping this in mind, the world community asserted its dominance over one of the seven countries that own nuclear weapons, the Islamic Republic of Iran. After the poorly implemented and temporary solution, the Joint Plan Of Action (JPOA), the P5+1 (Germany) took the matter in their own hands. After an executive order, countries deliberating for months and coming to a common ground, the JCPOA was implemented. However, the loopholes can be the reason for the world to be shattered. One must remember that it

applies only for fifteen years, which implies that in 2030, Iran holds the power to nuclear-bomb any country(s). Though the essence of the JCPOA is in its implementation, the sanctions granted to Iran could boost the country's economy and their weaponry's development too. Iran declared that it would no longer abide by any operational limitations of the JCPOA, but that it would maintain compliance with its safeguards obligations under the deal. One issue to deliberate is how Iran might potentially develop their other forms of weaponry like trade or cyber war, when the world has wrapped up all its resources to prevent a nuclear war. Theoretically, the world is safe. However, realistically, one mishap in monitoring and the world's fate is in a country's hand

INTRODUCTION

The JCPOA is a longstanding plan that has been in talks since 2015. Under this agreement, there are quotas to Iran's uranium resources and clauses that require it to convert nuclear facilities to prevent the risk of proliferation. However, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has access to Iran's nuclear facilities so that it can monitor and supervise if Iran

complies to the terms and conditions. That said, there are many contentions such as loosely defined terms in the deal such as how many advanced centrifuges can Iran have, whether the JCPOA is a strong deterrent to stop Iran's nuclear activities, and the impact of US-Iran trade embargo on the JCPOA.

BACKGROUND

1. INITIAL ACQUISITIONS OF NUCLEAR PLANTS

The foundation of the nuclear program in Iran was laid in the 1950s when the Shah of Iran received technical assistance for developing nuclear energy under the US Atoms For Peace Program.^[1]

In 1976, Iran paid USD 1 billion for 10% stakes at the uranium enrichment plant in France and 15% in RTZ Mining, Namibia.^[2]

The country also invested USD 700 million to purchase Uranium yellow cakes from South Africa and in sending technicians abroad for nuclear training, which was continued in 1978 too.^[3] The nuclear energy development program was motivated in 1967 when the United States supplied the Tehran Nuclear Research Centre (TNRC) with 5 MWt research reactors fueled by highly enriched uranium. However, due to the Iranian Revolution in 1979 and Khomeini's strong sentiments against nuclear technology, there was a major loss of profits or

technological developments that disintegrated the nuclear program. This forced many technicians to leave the country, hence forming a loop of losses for Iran. Even though he stopped the construction of the Bushehr Nuclear Plant in 1979, Khomeini decided to rebuild the plant and seek international assistance in 1984.^[4]

This led to deals between Pakistan (in 1987) and with China (in 1990) which were long-term cooperation agreements with the countries.

Along with training of personnel, China offered a 27 KW miniature neutron source reactor, two 30 MW Qinshan power reactors, along with Russia promising to complete Bushehr's construction, with another three reactors. Everything was coming along well, even given that Iran was healing the losses they faced from the war with Iraq.

2. THE ROLE OF USA'S DISCOVERY OF WEAPON DEVELOPMENT

However, the US Intelligence suspected Iran of using the civilian nuclear program as a cover for clandestine power weapon development. This made the US Government put pressure on potential suppliers to limit nuclear cooperation with Iran. This led to China not supplying Iran with the research reactor (which would help plutonium production) or the Qinshan power reactors or the other uranium conversion plant.^[5]

In August 1992, Russia and Iran signed the bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement, which made Russia agree to complete the construction of the plant in Bushehr as well as secretly offer to supply Iran with large research reactors, fuel fabrication facility and gas centrifuge plant in 1995.

Obstacles appeared for Iran when the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI) revealed the undeclared existence of the Natanz plant, the Kalaye electric

company, the heavy water production plant (under construction) at Arak and names of individuals and front companies involved in the nuclear program. ^[6] This pushed the International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA) to carry out multiple investigations in September and October 2003, and the Board came to a conclusion in November 2003 where they adopted a resolution to welcome Iran's decision to sign the Additional Protocol and suspend enrichment - these negotiations were

supported and signed by the P5+1 (P5+Germany) group. Since the term "suspend" was vaguely defined, Iran continued to produce centrifuge components and undertake small-scale conversion experiments.^[7]

Fortunately, in November 2004 the Iranian Government and the EU3 concluded negotiations that culminated in long-term cooperation in the form of the Paris agreement. ^[8]

3. REJECTING THE EU'S AGREEMENT AND BECOMING UNPOPULAR

In early November 2004, the CIA received information that Shahab 3's (a missile) nose cone was being modified to carry a nuclear warhead. At the same time, the IAEA found hidden blueprints for a more advanced P-2 centrifuge and a document detailing uranium hemisphere casting. ^[9] However, this was dismissed as Iranian officials denied the existence of this material, and deemed it forged. ^[10] After rejecting EU 3's long term agreement, because it was:

- a) highly demanding,
- b) not providing enough incentives,
- c) not showing any cooperation towards Iran's proposals, and
- d) violating Paris Agreement,

Iran told the IAEA that it would continue its uranium conversion activities in Esfahan. This led to W. Bush signing the

Executive Order 13382 on 28 June 2005, blocking financial assets of individuals and entities supporting WMD proliferation. This included four Iranian entities, two being the Atomic Energy Organisation of Iran and the Aerospace Industries Organisation. Angered, Tehran ended Additional Protocol implementation and resumed enrichment at Natanz from February 2006. ^[11] This made the Board (IAEA) vote for Iran's case to be taken to the UNSC. On 15 March 2006, UNSC's presidential statement asked Iran to cooperate, however, the then president, Ahmadinejad spoke on second uranium enrichment facilities with the P-2 centrifuges in April. The P5+1 then offered Tehran with advanced civilian nuclear technology, provided Iran suspended enrichment activities and resumed implementation of Additional Protocol. ^[12]

4. UNSC RESOLUTIONS AND THE EXECUTIVE ORDER

Right after Iran wrote a letter to Bush regarding the new deal (where they referred to the nuclear issue and not to the entire world community), the UNSC passed

Resolution 1696, where the following clauses were enacted: ^[13]

- a. Iran was to suspend enrichment,

b. International transfer of nuclear and missile technology to Iran was banned, and

c. Foreign assets of twelve individuals and ten organisations involved in the Iranian nuclear program were frozen.

The president of Iran ignored this and continued enriching uranium at Natanz, along with the inauguration of the heavy water production plant in Arak. This made the UNSC pass Resolution 1737 which was again ignored. ^[14]

Realising that Iran was not cooperating and a report published by the IAEA on Iran's secret nuclear program, the US and EU launched unprecedented unilateral measures, which concluded with the President of the United States sanctioning the Central Bank of Iran and

other foreign institutions for processing transactions related to oil and petroleum products on behalf of the Iranian companies and the government, with reference to the Menendez-Kirk amendment in December 2011. ^[15] The States granted waivers to twenty countries as they significantly reduced their purchase of oil (India and China included). On 23 January 2012, assets of the Central Bank of Iran were frozen and waivers were granted to ten members of the European Union. ^[16] After freezing the property of the Government of Iran on 5 February 2012, Obama signed the "Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Law" in August 2012, which increased the sanctions on Iran. Seeing serious economic losses, Iran was finally ready to have negotiations, which took place first under the JPOA.

DEFINITIONS

1. Enriched uranium: When the percent composition of uranium-235 has been increased in uranium through isotope separation.
2. Isotopes of uranium: Naturally occurring Uranium has three forms (called isotopes): uranium-238, uranium-235 and uranium-234.
3. Fissile material: It sustains the nuclear fission chain reaction. It's composition is uranium-235, plutonium-239 (prepared from uranium-238) and uranium-233 (prepared from thorium-232).
4. Centrifuge (Zippe-type centrifuge): It is a gas centrifuge designed to enrich the rare fissile isotope uranium-235 from the mixture of isotopes found in naturally occurring uranium compounds.
5. Nuclear power: When low-enriched uranium fuel is used to produce electricity through fission in a nuclear reactor.
6. Nuclear weapon: It is an explosive device that derives its destructive force from nuclear reactions, either fission or from a combination of fission and fusion reactions.
7. Spent fuel reprocessing: It is the chemical separation of fission products and unused uranium from spent nuclear fuel.
8. Spent nuclear fuel: It is the fuel that has been irradiated in a nuclear reactor.
9. Economic sanctions: They are commercial and financial penalties applied by one or more countries against a targeted self-governing state, group, or individual.

10. Asset freezing: It is a legal process which prevents a defendant whether innocent or guilty from dissipating their assets from beyond the jurisdiction of a court so as to frustrate a potential judgment.
11. Frozen asset: It is an asset that cannot readily be turned into cash without heavy loss.

SCOPE OF DEBATE

The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) is Iran's nuclear deal where Iran agreed to a set of conditions laid out in order to have all sanctions lifted against the nation. This agreement was the product of almost 2 years of negotiations and was eventually signed in 2015 by the P5+1, the European Union, and Iran itself. ^[17] Delegates may also reference UNSC resolution 2231 which creates jurisdiction of the UNSC over the deal. Under the JCPOA (which is set to expire by 2030), Iran is limited to 6,104 centrifuges; a maximum of 300kg of low-enriched Uranium at any time; and a complete ban on medium and high-enriched Uranium. ^[18]

While the JCPOA can be favoured for reasons such as an almost-unanimous

consensus reached and there being no apparent proposed alternative solution, there are nonetheless many issues with the deal. This unanimous consensus, however, is a clear win from a diplomatic standpoint. Having the United States draw up a treaty with one of its so called 'axis of evil' (Iran), is a major policy win, and it would be very difficult to renegotiate an entirely new deal. It is also deemed undesirable because whilst it prevents Iran from being nuclear now, it does not mean Iran can never become a nuclear power. Delegates should be aware of the points for and against the implementation of JCPOA to ensure that the debate is well substantiated with clear arguments, and a balanced view is presented without being skewed to one side.

DIPLOMATIC CONFLICT AND US INVOLVEMENT

When analysing the JCPOA, the most glaring issue exists in the form of the United States' policy regarding the deal. Delegates will remember, of course, that the United States of America under the Trump administration has held a policy of non-reciprocity concerning the terms of the deal, and eventually withdrew from the deal in 2018.¹⁹ This is especially pertinent to the debate as the consequences of the US reimposing sanctions on Iran prompted the current

status of the JCPOA today, mainly that Iran opted to increase its uranium enrichment beyond the 3.5% level — a decision that was verified by IAEA inspectors. ^[20]

The reimposition of US sanctions on Iran has left the JCPOA in a political limbo. Despite the European Union and other parties to the deal explicitly endorsing the deal despite the US's policy choices, the economic strength of the United States places the entire deal and

the status of Iran's nuclear programme in the balance. With this in mind, delegates should concretely analyse the position of future President Biden, as well as the position of President Trump, to attempt to create a future framework that would appease the United States whilst still preserving the core identity of the deal.

In guiding UNSC decisions, the 12 conditions stated in the Secretary of State's speech in 2018 which are outlined below are especially relevant. ^[21] Even though future President Biden may have very different conditions, it is necessary to note that these conditions may still be a guiding principle when it comes to Biden's future foreign policy. In general, these points can be condensed down as the following:

Iran must stop all their nuclear and ballistic missile program development, and must grant the IAEA full access to Iranian nuclear sites.

Iran must release US citizens, as well as allied citizens, who are detained on spurious charges.

Iran must cease funding 'terrorist groups' (such as Hezbollah and Hamas), in

the Middle East, and its other alleged interferences to stir insurgencies and instability.

Iran must seek peace and cease threatening Iraq, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE, and must halt its threats to the cyber systems of other nations, and their shipping lines.

In addition to this, delegates should also note President Trump's stance that the United States remains a party to the deal, despite it not following the terms of the agreement. ^[22] In any resolutions, delegates may want to clearly delineate the terms of the agreement and avoid the legal ramifications of the previous JCPOA, mainly that "The JCPOA is not a treaty or an executive agreement, and is not a signed document". ^[23] When delegates are attempting to find a US compromise, analysing the train of thought of the US state department and deconstructing the Israeli reports is critical in understanding the position of the State Department versus the position of the Trump administration in its "maximum pressure" doctrine ^[24] - this would help in guiding delegates towards a solution that would work under a Biden administration.

IRANIAN POLITICS

Before any concrete plan is made, delegates must also consider the political environment of Iran at present. In particular, delegates must note that the passing of a hardline bill in the Iranian Parliament has resulted in a polarising situation for the JCPOA. The bill itself binds the Government to adopt a policy of violation against the JCPOA should economic sanctions continue. ^[25] That is to say, the law compels the Iranian Government to go against the JCPOA in a variety of fields, which would trigger

economic sanctions. The bill creates a 2 month window for the UNSC to come to an agreement before Iran will continue its nuclear programme and expel IAEA officials from the country. This bill comes at the backdrop of Government disapproval, the vocal opposition of Iran's nuclear development chief comes with a glimmer of hope for the council. His official and direct statements where he questions the actual practicality of the bill. This can be seen with the article that directs the Government to build almost 1,000 new

centrifuges for enrichment in particular faced backlash from the Chief where he made the following statement: “Where should the money come from? If it’s local resources, then they either don’t know how much local resources we have or they don’t know how much IR-6 centrifuges cost”.^[26] This would indicate that even though the Government is bound constitutionally to follow the law, there is a degree of flexibility within the Government, this flexibility and opportunity must be exploited by the UNSC to stop the implementation of this bill.

Furthermore, the Iranian political landscape is dominated by the so-called ‘Principalists’. Iranian political factions can broadly be separated into 2 large groups: the Principalists, and the Reformists. Within these groups there are both left and right leaning factions however for the purposes of foreign policy, these are less important. The Principalists, who host a majority of 221 in a Parliament of 290

members, maintain a policy of deeply theocratic rule, aiming to maintain the status quo in Iran. Whilst the Reformists, who lack the necessary power to enact change, aim to gradually secularise the nation and lean towards more liberal policies.^[27] A notable faction is the controlling force between the Principalist movement, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard. The effect of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, which continues to have huge influence on internal politics, cannot be overstated. The majority of the IRGC are staunchly against the JCPOA, and the bill passed by Parliament represents this view.^[28] The IRGC and its influence is also key to understanding the stances of the United States, who goes so far as to classify the Corps as a terrorist organisation. The backdrop of ‘terrorist’ laws makes it difficult to approach the creation of a resolution that appeases everyone, however tensions between the IRGC and the Iranian cabinet could serve to aid the UNSC when attempting to find an agreement.

HUMANITARIAN ISSUES

The economic situation of Iran should also be considered when reaching an agreement with the country, Following US sanctions, the GDP of the entire nation dropped by 6%, a damaging statistic that had repercussions on the ground.^[29] Even more troubling is the COVID situation, where Iran is unable to purchase medical equipment as the emergency funds provided by the IMF are blocked by pressure from the United States. This creates a humanitarian and economic crisis that must be considered in any resolution debated by the UNSC.

Additionally, the Iranian Government has long had an abysmal human rights record. Reuters estimates

that almost 1500 citizens were killed in protests in November of 2019 by Government forces, which begs the question where do Human Rights come into the JCPOA. It is clear that the Iranian Government may either be allowing, or even complicit, in a large majority of these human rights abuses, so it could be drawn that the lack of any human rights assurances within the previous JCPOA, allowed Iran to essentially get away with anything (whilst any other nation would have been sanctioned heavily and forced to comply with the UDHR). Despite the JCPOA solely being based on Nuclear proliferation, the United States and European Union have frequently cited human rights abuses as a key contextual

point when it comes to formulating new policies, it may be relevant to look at human rights as a talking point when it comes to deciding on a new resolution.^[30] Delegates should identify whether the Iranian Government can be convinced to improve their human rights record, or at least admit independent observers, in order to secure the lifting of sanctions in a new JCPOA.

These human rights violations produce a troubling backdrop for any negotiations that could occur within our UNSC, when looking and evaluating at the

ACCOUNTABILITY AND THE JCPOA ITSELF

The JCPOA has been criticised on both sides of the board as being too lenient on Iran. The deal itself only covers nuclear proliferation and it has to be noted that given Iran's internal situation, the international community should be focusing on treating other systemic issues in Iran (such as human rights). In addition to this, US politicians in particular have declared that Iran essentially ridding itself of all sanctions simply by following this one deal whilst not being required to make any changes to its foreign policy (particularly that concerning Israel) or internal humanitarian issues.

Finally, delegates need to consider one of the foundational aspects of the

terms of the deal (which essentially consist of lifting all punishment as long as Iran fulfils their nuclear terms), delegates must note that the essential immunity of Iran against sanctions places at risk these marginalised groups and oppressed people. Existing race tensions, particular with the Christian and Baha'i minorities,^[31] has led to a precarious situation for the international community. Should the scope of the JCPOA expand to ensure the maintenance of human rights? Or should we risk oppression in the name of international security.

JCPOA, the inspections themselves. The implementation of the JCPOA has faced scrutiny in the past by politicians and experts alike, particularly citing the provision that 24 days are allotted to solve access disputes between Iran and the IAEA.^[32] This has been condemned as an opportunity for abuse by the Iranian Government, who can continue nuclear proliferation in secret. Despite many experts and IAEA officials claiming that they have full access on the ground, it is nonetheless relevant to consider these claims and determine if there is a more holistic approach to ensuring accountability.

KEY STAKEHOLDERS

IRAN

Iran agreed to eliminate its stockpile of uranium. However, the US's aggression as revealed by the economic war through tariffs has caused Iran to refuse any attempt to reconcile through talks. Furthermore, if this is unsuccessful, Iran is expected to invent massive nuclear weapons that could trigger a war with the US.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

The USA is seeking a new nuclear deal from Iran in terms of harsher regulations such as surveillance from the International Atomic Energy Agency and shutting down enrichment facilities. It is also being urged by Germany to agree to the plan^[33]

EUROPE

Europe is amenable to compromise, especially because the aftermath of dropping the JCPOA can be grievous - an implicit greenlight to Iran to invent a bomb evoking fears of war. The EU will also continue to maintain cooperation with Iran due to the rich oil supply that Iran boasts which is imperative for trade. It will also shy away from aggravating instability in

Iran due to fears of triggering a refugee movement towards the EU. It will also attempt to ally with Iran to diversify oil imports and reduce energy dependence from Russia.

UNITED KINGDOM

It is leaning in favour to Iran with former Prime Minister Theresa May speaking in favour of the deal. However, the UK is also cautious of Iran's "adventurist and expansionist" plans in the region.

CHINA

China also wishes the US to lift sanctions on Iran. China wants to ally with Iran due to the dependency on oil. This is especially the case after recent US-China Trade War tensions.

ENERGY DEPENDANT

They are also aligned with Iran's vision because of the trade advantage of oil supplies that Iran boasts. ^[34] The creation of JCPOA meant that Iran had to ease energy sector related investments and instead ramp up on crude oil production. Despite the high oil reliance in the Asian market, the countries have prepared to tackle Iran's potential declines in oil availability by diversifying their supply chains and reaching out to Mozambique for instance. ^[35]

QUESTIONS A RESOLUTION MUST ANSWER

Considering the amount of time and the volume of the agenda, the Dais has put down a few questions that can be used as a basis for research. Do note that the Dais expects these questions answered in the position paper and the resolution.

1. Will the JCPOA be a long term solution to the constant nuclear threat by Iran? If it will not, then what is the point of drafting such a detailed document when it does not serve a long term purpose?
2. As Iran is a sovereign Islamic Republic, it is not obligated to abide by any deals/recommendatory documents. In what situations will Iran compromise on its own benefit for the purpose of world peace?
3. Should the attempt to reach a consensus on the JCPOA be futile preventing it from being passed, what are the repercussions and how would countries manage the potential side effects such as e.g. a war waged by Iran due to the excessive resources it has?
4. Now that the JCPOA has been violated very recently, how accountable is Iran to the deal?
5. Does the IAEA intervening in Iran's nuclear weapon development make the statements and developments more transparent or more prone to being outwitting?

ENDNOTES

1. Joseph Cirincione, Jon Wolfsthal and Miriam Rajkumar, "Iran," in *Deadly Arsenals: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Threats* (Washington, DC, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005), p. 298.
2. Oliver Meier, "Iran and Foreign Enrichment: A Troubled Model," *The Arms Control Association*, January/February 2006.
3. David Albright, Jacqueline Shire, and Paul Brannan, "Is Iran Running Out of Yellowcake?" *The Institute for Science and International Security*, 11 February 2009.
4. *Iran's Strategic Weapons Programmes: A Net Assessment* (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2005), p. 12.
5. *Iran's Strategic Weapons Programmes: A Net Assessment* (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2005), p. 13.
6. Ibid
7. Ibid
8. The International Atomic Energy Agency "Communication dated 26 November 2004 received from the Permanent Representatives of France, Germany, the Islamic Republic of Iran, and the United Kingdom concerning the agreement signed in Paris on 15 November 2004,"
9. International Atomic Energy Agency, "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran," Report by the Director General
10. Jeffrey Richelson, *Spying on the Bomb: American Nuclear Intelligence from Nazi Germany to Iran and North Korea*

11. Executive Order 13382, "Blocking Property of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferators and Their Supporters," 28 June 2005
12. Carrot-stick' deal agreed on Iran," CNN, 2 June 2006
13. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1696, adopted July 31, 2006.
14. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1737, adopted 27 December 2006.
15. Josh Rogin, "Iran sanctions amendment emerges from conference largely intact"
16. U.S. Department of the Treasury, "Fact Sheet: Implementation of National Defense Authorization Act Sanctions on Iran,"
17. Perkovich, "Parsing the Iran Deal"
18. The Economist Briefing, "Making the world a bit safer"
19. Landler, "Trump Abandons Iran Nuclear Deal He Long Scorned"
20. Kottasová, "Iran breaches uranium enrichment limits"
21. The Heritage Foundation, "May 21, 2018 - After the Deal: A New Iran Strategy"
22. US Department of State, "24/11/2015 State Department Letter:JCPOA" 1.
23. Ibid
24. Bayyanat, "Why Trump's Maximum Pressure Strategy Won't Get Iran Back to the Negotiating Table"
25. Tehran Times, "Majlis focusing on 20% uranium, expelling IAEA inspectors, leaving JCPOA"
26. Motamedi, "Iran says it has resumed 20% uranium enrichment at Fordow site"
27. Mohseni, "Politics of Change and Power in Iran"
28. Katzman, "Iran: Politics, Human Rights, and U.S. Policy"
29. Reuters, "Iran economy to shrink 9.5% this year amid tighter U.S. sanctions, says IMF"
30. Katzman, "Iran: Internal Politics and U.S. Policy and Options"
31. Ibid., 16.
32. Lewis, "Republicans fume over Iran nuclear deal"
33. Parliament of Australia, "The Iran Nuclear Deal"
34. Calabrese, "Asian end-users have been preparing for possible sharp declines in the availability of Iranian crude oil and condensate. Their supply contingency plans have included efforts to diversify their suppliers — South Korea (US), Japan (Mozambique), and India (Iraq)"
35. Parliament of Australia, "The Iran Nuclear Deal"

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Abolghasem Bayyanat, "Why Trump's Maximum Pressure Strategy Won't Get Iran Back to the Negotiating Table," World Politics Review, August 10, 2020, <https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/28977/for-iran-jcpoa-replacement-is-a-non-starter-thanks-to-trump> (accessed January 4, 2021).

CNN, "Carrot-stick deal agreed on Iran," CNN, 2 June 2006.

Commonwealth Parliament; Parliament House, Canberra. "The Iran Nuclear Deal-Facts, Issues, Stakeholders, and Australian Policy: a Quick Guide." Home – Parliament of Australia. Commonwealth Parliament; Parliament House, Canberra, ACT, 2600; May 18, 2018. https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/rp/rp1718/Quick_Guides/IranNuclear.

David, Albright, et al., "Is Iran running out of Yellowcake?"

George, Perkovich, et al., "Parsing the Iran Deal," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Accessed January 3, 2021, <https://carnegieendowment.org/2015/08/06/parsing-iran-deal/iec5>.

Institute for Strategic Studies, "Iran's Strategic Weapons Programmes : A Net Assessment", IISS, 2005.

Ivana Kottasová, "Iran to breach uranium enrichment limits set by landmark nuclear deal," CNN, July 7, 2018, <https://edition.cnn.com/2019/07/07/middleeast/iran-nuclear-agreement-intl/index.html> (accessed January 4, 2021).

Ivana Kottasová, "Iran to breach uranium enrichment limits set by landmark nuclear deal," CNN, July 7, 2018, <https://edition.cnn.com/2019/07/07/middleeast/iran-nuclear-agreement-intl/index.html> (accessed January 4, 2021).

Jeffrey, Richelson, "Spying on the Bomb : American Nuclear Intelligence from Nazi Germany to Iran and North Korea".

Josh, Rogin, "Iran sanctions amendment emerges from conference largely intact"

Kenneth Katzman, "Iran: Internal Politics and U.S. Policy and Options," Congressional Research Service, December 9, 2020, <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL32048.pdf> (accessed January 4, 2021).

Mark Landler, "Trump Abandons Iran Nuclear Deal He Long Scorned," The New York Times, May 8, 2018, <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/08/world/middleeast/trump-iran-nuclear-deal.html> (accessed January 3, 2021).

Mark Pompeo, "After the Deal: A New Iran Strategy," The Heritage Foundation, Washington D.C, DC: Heritage.org, May 21, 2018, <https://www.heritage.org/defense/event/after-the-deal-new-iran-strategy> (accessed January 4, 2021).

Maziar Motamedi, "Iran says it has resumed 20% uranium enrichment at Fordow site," Al-Jazeera, January 4, 2021, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/1/4/iran-says-it-has-resumed-20-percent-uranium-enrichment-at-fordow-site> (accessed January 4, 2021).

Nathan, Busch, "No End in Sight: The continuing menace of Nuclear proliferation".

Office of the President of the United States. Executive order 13382, "Blocking Property of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferators and Their Supporters," 28 June 2005.

Oliver, Meier, "Iran and Foreign Enrichment: A Troubled Model".

Paul Lewis, Sabrina Siddiqui and Ben Jacobs, "Republicans fume over Iran nuclear deal but hope of undermining accord is slim," The Guardian, July 15, 2015, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jul/14/republicans-iran-nuclear-deal-reaction> (accessed January 4, 2021).

Payam Mohseni, "Factionalism, Privatization, and the Political economy of regime transformation," Indiana Series in Middle East Studies, 2016, Power and Change in Iran: Politics of Contention and Conciliation.

Reuters Staff, "Iran economy to shrink 9.5% this year amid tighter U.S. sanctions, says IMF," Reuters, October 15, 2019, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-economy-imf-idUSKBN1WU28M> (accessed January 4, 2021).

Soliman, Mohammed, Lina Raafat, Mick Mulroy, Various Authors, Ruba Husari, and Rauf Mammadov. "Is Asia Iran's Energy Lifeline?" Middle East Institute, January 27, 2021. <https://www.mei.edu/publications/asia-irans-energy-lifeline>.

Tehran Times, “Majlis focusing on 20% uranium, expelling IAEA inspectors, leaving JCPOA,” Tehran Times, November 29, 2020, <https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/455236/Majlis-focusing-on-20-uranium-expelling-IAEA-inspectors-leaving> (accessed January 4, 2021).

The Economist Daily Briefing, “Making the world a bit safer : An imperfect deal that is better than the alternatives,” The Economist, July 18, 2015, <https://www.economist.com/briefing/2015/07/18/making-the-world-a-bit-safer> (accessed January 3, 2021).

The IAEA, “Communication dated 26 November 2004 received from the Permanent Representatives of France, Germany, the Islamic Republic of Iran, and the United Kingdom concerning the agreement signed in Paris on 15 November 2004”.

The IAEA, “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” Director General of the IAEA, Report by the Director General.

UNSC, “UNSC Resolution 1696, adopted July 31, 2006”.

UNSC, “UNSC Resolution 1737, adopted 27 December 2006”.

U.S. Department of State, 11/24/2015 State Department Letter to The Honorable Mike Pompeo, by Julie Frifield, <http://www.humanrightsvoces.org/assets/attachments/documents/11.24.2015.state.dept.letter.jcpoa.pdf> (accessed January 4, 2021).

U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Fact Sheet: Implementation of National Defense Authorization Act Sanctions on Iran”.

FURTHER READING

<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jul/14/republicans-iran-nuclear-deal-reaction>
<https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/198546/1/ceswp-v10-i3-p291-305.pdf>
<https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/5a5f83524.pdf> <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/1/4/iran-says-it-has-resumed-20-percent-uranium-enrichment-at-fordow-site> <https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2020/05/08/jcpoa-not-improved-irans-human-rights-record/>
[https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2020/603515/EXPO_IDA\(2020\)603515_EN.pdf](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2020/603515/EXPO_IDA(2020)603515_EN.pdf) <https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/455052/Iran-Parliament-moves-to-raise-uranium-enrichment-level-to-20> <https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/455288/Iranian-Parliament-passes-generalities-of-anti-sanction-plan> <https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/455236/Majlis-focusing-on-20-uranium-expelling-IAEA-inspectors-leaving> <https://financialtribune.com/articles/national/106372/foreign-ministry-s-views-missing-in-majlis-anti-sanction-bill> <https://en.radiofarda.com/a/30967264.html> <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/08/world/middleeast/trump-iran-nuclear-deal.html> <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/1/4/iran-says-it-has-resumed-20-percent-uranium-enrichment-at-fordow-site> [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2017/578024/EXPO_IDA\(2017\)578024_EN.pdf](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2017/578024/EXPO_IDA(2017)578024_EN.pdf) <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL32048.pdf> <https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/5a5f83524.pdf> <https://www.nti.org/learn/countries/iran/nuclear/>

TOPIC 2: REFORMATION OF THE UNSC

SUMMARY

Reforms to the United Nations Security Council refers to solving the issues posed by multiple countries on the grounds of the body being an undemocratic and unfairly hierarchical one. By Decision 62/557, there have been five key issues that the UNSC has to combat, in order to make it a more fair and justified system. In its present terms of functioning, the UNSC has been unable to respond to and resolve conflicts in multiple regions with regard to international peace and security. After drawing a pattern between all these issues and regions, one notices that

these issues are in States that are not given equal representation in the UNSC, they are non-permanent members. The decision-making policy remains uncertain and risky, there is no support for global security and there is no atmosphere for the respect of principles of international order and security. Hence, countries want to come up with a framework so as to support decentralisation of the governing power and authority, so as to make the UNSC a representative and participatory body.

INTRODUCTION

Out of all the committees in the United Nations, the security council has special powers such as binding resolutions. That said, there is a pressing need for reform to include countries that require the assistance of UNSC. Including some countries would potentially boost the representation of underrepresented nations and enable constitutional amendments to existing powers such as veto. The veto power itself is a

common dispute, and likely the main talking point for delegates. Veto power could unfairly disadvantage smaller nations within the UNSC, and also remove accountability of the P5 by allowing them to essentially fail any resolution that goes against their agenda. Any reforms would make UNSC more beneficial and much stronger in terms of member strength, giving more opportunity for countries to raise genuine issues.

According to the Economist Intelligence Unit's Democracy Index, the world averaged at 5.52 (out of 10, 10 being the most democratic) in 2016. However, it fell to 5.48 in 2017. This is just an instance to show how non-democracy is being "normalised" in the recent past. Even though the number of United Nations States has quadrupled since 1945, the system of permanent members has not changed. The P5 still continues to be in power. In 2005, it seemed like Africa and the G4 would reconcile their differences, however, China and Russia declared such a reform to be out of question. This was supported by the USA when the countries arranged for rallies to shut down the talks between Africa and the G4. The four flaws countries have recognised in design. These are:

- a) Inequality,
- b) Exclusiveness,
- c) Rotating seats, and
- d) Representation.

There are mainly six groups that have their ways to battle this issue. These are:

1. **THE G4:** India, Germany, Brazil and Japan.

Ideology: They want permanent seats for themselves, and are even open to council re-elections once in fifteen years.

2. **UNITING FOR CONSENSUS (UFC):** Italy, Spain, Republic of Korea, Pakistan, Argentina, Mexico and Canada.

Ideology: They oppose the G4 by not agreeing with the concept of addition of new seats and wish to abolish the veto.

3. **THE ARAB GROUP:** The 22 States demand a permanent seat for the Arab nations.

Ideology: They criticise the veto, but have proposed no solution.

4. **THE AFRICAN GROUP:** The countries of the African Union form a part of this group.

Ideology: They want two permanent seats and five non-permanent seats for the African nations. They wish to abolish the veto, but do not mind it as long as all permanent members have it.

5. **THE ACT:** This consists of 21 small member States.

Ideology: They want to improve the working method of the UNSC by working on areas like accountability, coherence and stability so that all members are involved in the decision making process.

6. **THE L69:** These are forty developing countries (Brazil and India included).

Ideology: They want to include six permanent and non-permanent members from across all the UN regions. They believe that either the veto should be abolished or all permanent members get to exercise it.

Although France and Britain are open to reform, the other three countries are not. The United Nations is essentially supposed to provide a platform for deliberation, logistic expertise and cooperation with the global community. However, with reference to Article 5 of Chapter 5 of the United Nations Charter,

any amendments to the rules requires an amendment to the Charter. Since the P5 has the veto power, all of the States would have to agree to a change, in order for it to pass. Hence, the world community has

realised that their argument has to be strong enough to convince all the 5 States in power to give up their power, something that seems impossible. ^[1]

DEFINITIONS

Categories of membership: the five permanent members (US, UK, Russia, France and China) versus the member states. The permanent members have the veto power,

The Absolute Veto power: the right to oppose a decision made or action taken by the law making body. In this situation, the P5 countries can oppose or limit any resolution,

Regional representation: this refers to equal representation of the non-permanent member states,

Reform: make changes to something, so as to make it better,

International Security: measures taken by States and organisations to ensure mutual survival and security.

With respect to the UNSC,

Inequality: this refers to the concept of permanent members (who exercise veto and are in permanent control) and the non-permanent members,

Exclusiveness: this limits the Council's membership to a small portion of the UN's membership, which makes it lack legitimacy, and

Rotating seats: It refers to periodic elections, which leads to instability and ineffectiveness of helping all members.

1. CATEGORIES OF MEMBERSHIP

The issue of the P5 and its relevance 75 years after the end of the Second World War and the signing of the UN Charter is a main talking point delegates should consider. As of now, the original P5 members of the US, UK, Russia, France, and China have remained the same. However, it should be noted that when the People's Republic of China was recognised as the legitimate legal representative of China in A/RES/2758(XXVI), and when Russia succeeded the Soviet Union in 1991, there

were no actual amendments made to the UN charter. As such, delegates must consider whether there is a legal requirement for a charter amendment when adding a P5 country based on this precedence. Additionally, should delegates wish to change the P5 system altogether, it should be considered whether this would disenfranchise the most powerful nations of the world, who may lose their representation despite their profound political and economic power over other nation.

2. THE VETO POWER

The veto power is a similarly linked issue to the original intention of the UN charter, the veto power itself was demanded by P5 nations as a condition of their involvement in the UN. Over the evolution of the UNSC's role we have seen the veto power being abused by the P5 to avoid anti-P5 resolutions. For example, the veto power was used extensively by the Russian Federation to block resolutions concerning the Syrian Civil War. On the

other side of the political aisle, the US has used its veto power to block resolutions concerning Israel.

Delegates may choose to view the veto power as a relic of the past and of a less democratic international relations working space. However delegates must also consider how any attempt for the repealing of the veto power would play with the P5 nations themselves.

3. REGIONAL REPRESENTATION AND SIZE CHANGES

The size and representation of different continents is also a topic that should be discussed. The last time UNSC size was changed was in 1965 and since then close to two dozen new countries have been formed, most in Africa following decolonisation. Additionally, the UNSC is hopelessly unrepresentative of population

centres, only 3 of the 10 most populous countries actually have a permanent seat in the UNSC. The non-permanent members of the UNSC are elected according to continent and this leads to the people of continents such as Europe being grossly overrepresented, whilst the larger population centres in Asia and Africa lack the same levels of representation.

4. REFORM PROPOSALS

Other than past increases of UNSC size, there is no actual precedent of large-scale UNSC reform. However, there do exist a number of UN-affiliated or international movements and ideas that seek to improve the UNSC. It should be noted, however, that the P5 nations mostly argue strongly against any reforms, with the exception of the G4 proposal. China in particular has stated it would block any G4 additions to the UNSC.

1. G4 proposal. The G4 proposes to add six more permanent seats (making it a P11). This P11 would include the existing P5, the G4 members, and two additional African nations as well as an additional four non-permanent seats (one seat each for Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe, and Latin America), and an extra 4 non permanent seats. The G4 proposal also seeks a trial period of 15 years to determine whether full veto

power should be accorded to the additional permanent members. Additionally, the P5 nations (except for China) have expressed support for this plan; with the UK, USA, France and Russia signing on. ^[2]

2. The L69 proposal is similar to the G4 proposal in that it seeks to add the same permanent members. However, it seeks to add close to 2 dozen non-permanent seats to the UNSC. ^[3]
3. The African Union proposal follows similar lines except with a direct concern for African interests, believing that more African permanent and non permanent members should be added. ^[4]
4. The Uniting For Consensus proposal is the most radical by far, it proposes to get rid of the permanent members altogether, instead increasing the size of the non-permanent contingent and hinging the UNSC on elections towards it. ^[5]

KEY STAKEHOLDERS

1. USA AND CHINA

As the main powers in the UNSC, USA and China are key actors, especially because they are embroiled in trade war. That said, the USA under Biden's administration is open to reform. China wishes to provide more space to the underrepresented nations and also uphold the values in the UN Envoy.

2. JAPAN + G4

They have displayed determination and resilience in peacekeeping / peacebuilding, nuclear-non-proliferation and disarmament, and upholding its unique status as a non-nuclear weapon State. While Japan has continually expressed interest in joining the UNSC, it can never successfully do so without facing its past history of aggression such as during the Japanese Occupation. However, China opposes the idea of Japan joining on board, fearing over representation (and hence, higher threat) posed by Asia.

3. IRAN

Iran wants a UNSC reform especially because the EU and US imposed sanctions in Iran. Yet, UNSC pressured Iran further, necessitating the wish for a reform.

4. INDIA

India looks forward to a UNSC reform, especially after being backed by Obama and China agreeing not to utilise its veto power to stop India's entrance. As an infant in nuclear power, and given the ongoing clashes with Pakistan, it is necessary now more than ever for India to join UNSC so as to resolve issues in an amicable manner.

5. BRAZIL

Brazil has an upper hand in the UNSC especially because it justifies its position for joining UNSC by stating the underrepresentation of Latin America. Furthermore, it is a major contributor to UN peacekeeping missions.

QUESTIONS A RESOLUTION MUST ANSWER

Considering the less time and the volume of the agenda, the Executive Board has put down a few questions that can be used as a basis for research. Do note that the Dais expects these questions answered in the position paper and the resolution.

1. What is the current status of UNSC reformation? If there has been progress, what is it?

2. How should the UNSC determine the countries that will be included in an expansion of the UNSC?
3. Given the current dynamics of the UNSC, which solutions might be UNSC more willing to embrace?
4. If there is a hierarchy between countries in the UNSC, will this not increase the difference between the developed, developing and underdeveloped countries?
5. Instead of eliminating one party's (either the P5 or the countries demanding reforms) wishes, is there a way to come to common ground?

ENDNOTES

1. Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Reform of the UN Security Council", The Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, February 2016, <https://www.mae.ro/en/node/16885> (Accessed 23 January 2021)
2. Ville, Lättilä, "A New Proposal for UNSC Reform", Oxford Research Group, 28 May 2019, <https://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/blog/a-new-proposal-for-un-security-council-reform> (Accessed 23 January 2021).
3. The Security Council Report, "In Hindsight: Security Council Reform", Security Council Report, September 2019, <https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2019-09/in-hindsight-security-council-reform.php> (Accessed 23 January 2021).
4. Global Policy Forum, "Common African Position on UNSC Reform", GPF, March 9 2005, <https://www.globalpolicy.org/security-council/security-council-reform/41201.html> (Accessed 24 January 2021).
5. UN, "Uniting for Consensus", United Nations, 26 July 2005, <https://www.un.org/press/en/2005/ga10371.doc.htm> (accessed 23 January 2021)

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Global Policy Forum, "Common African Position on UNSC Reform", GPF, March 9 2005, <https://www.globalpolicy.org/security-council/security-council-reform/41201.html> (Accessed 24 January 2021).
- Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Reform of the UN Security Council", The Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, February 2016, <https://www.mae.ro/en/node/16885> (Accessed 23 January 2021)
- The Security Council Report, "In Hindsight: Security Council Reform", Security Council Report, September 2019, <https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2019-09/in-hindsight-security-council-reform.php> (Accessed 23 January 2021).
- UN, "Uniting for Consensus", United Nations, 26 July 2005, <https://www.un.org/press/en/2005/ga10371.doc.htm> (accessed 23 January 2021)

Ville, Lättilä, "A New Proposal for UNSC Reform", Oxford Research Group, 28 May 2019,
<https://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/blog/a-new-proposal-for-un-security-council-reform> (Accessed 23 January 2021).

FURTHER READING

https://www.gwc.org.uk/default/assets/File/MUN_papers/2011_conference/reformSC.pdf
http://dev.calymca.org/images/documents/MUN/18th_MUN/TPGs/UPDATED/18th_MUN_GA_TPG_4B_Security_Council_Reform.pdf

https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/sc/pdfs/pamph_unsc21c_en.pdf
<https://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/blog/a-new-proposal-for-un-security-council-reform>
<https://www.deccanherald.com/opinion/main-article/reform-the-unsc-757089.html>
<https://unu.edu/publications/articles/united-nations-security-council-reform.html>
<https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/aussenpolitik/internationale-organisationen/vereintenationen/reformsr-fragen/231618>
<https://theprint.in/world/enormous-divisions-on-unsc-expansion-reforms-need-package-solution-says-china/509666/>